We propose a statistical model for weighted temporal networks capable of measuring the level of heterogeneity in a financial system. Our model focuses on the level of diversification of financial institutions; that is, whether they are more inclined to distribute their assets equally among partners, or if they rather concentrate their commitment towards a limited number of institutions. Crucially, a Markov property is introduced to capture time dependencies and to make our measures comparable across time. We apply the model on an original dataset of Austrian interbank exposures. The temporal
Introduction
During the past 10 years, the EU was hit by two major financial crises.
In 2008, the problems started initially in the US subprime mortgage market and were partially caused by lax regulation and overly confident debt ratings.
The source of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011, however, was most likely private debt arising from property bubble and resulting in government bailouts. The lack of a common fiscal union in the EU did not help with the situation, which resulted in the European central bank providing cheap loans to maintain a steady cash flow between EU banks. During these turbulent times, European banks were facing high levels of uncertainty. It was not clear which counterparty would remain solvent in the foreseeable future and even sovereign bonds were no longer considered the safest option. In the face of these unfavorable conditions, the banks were forced to reconsider their interbank investments and re-adjust their portfolios in order to account for the change in the economic situation.
In this paper, we study interbank exposures in Austria between the spring of 2008 and autumn of 2011. Namely, we introduce a dynamic network model to analyze banks exposures' diversification patterns as well as the overall trend towards diversification in the Austrian interbank market. To accomplish this task, we create an original latent variable model that allows one to analyze weighted networks evolving over time. This approach provides us with a model-based measure of systemic risk locally for each bank, but also globally for the financial system as a whole. In our application, we show that our model-based measure provides a qualitatively different view when compared with a basic descriptive statistic.
Our paper contributes to the literature on systemic risk and financial networks. This strand of literature has often focused on the stability of financial systems as well as the possibility of contagious defaults. One of the earliest papers on the topic was the work of Allen and Gale (2000) , who have shown that the structure of the interbank market is important for the evaluation of possible contagious bankruptcies. Later on, Gai and Kapadia (2010) extended their work from a simple model of four institutions to a financial network of an arbitrary size. Other notable papers on systemic risk include, for example, Glasserman and Young (2016) or Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) , while Upper (2011) provides an excellent survey of regulatory-published scientific reports on the subject. With respect to the questions on diversification, we refer the reader to Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) and Frey and Hledik (2014) where a nontrivial relationship between diversification and contagious defaults is presented, or to Goncharenko, Hledik, and Pinto (2015) where banks endogenously choose their level of diversification in an equilibrium setting. Our paper relates to these works, since it is the structure of a financial network we are studying, while exploring the questions regarding diversification at the same time. We further add to these papers introducing a new generative mechanism and a modelling framework where diversification and homogeneity of the system can be studied inter-temporally.
Another strand of literature that we are connecting to are articles on latent variable modelling of network data. Prominent examples of such latent variable approaches include the latent position models of Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock (2002) , later extended to the dynamic framework by Sarkar and Moore (2006) , and the latent stochastic blockmodels (Nowicki and Snijders, 2001 ) extended to a dynamic framework by Yang, Chi, Zhu, Gong, and Jin (2011) , Xu and Hero (2014) and Matias and Miele (2017) , among others.
These latent variable models possess a number of desirable theoretical features, as illustrated in Rastelli, Friel, and Raftery (2016) and Daudin, Picard, and Robin (2008) , respectively.
Our approach has a number of similarities with other recent papers that apply a latent variable framework to model networks. These include Friel, Rastelli, Wyse, and Raftery (2016) , where the authors introduce a dynamic latent position model to measure the financial instability of the Irish Stock Exchange; Sewell and Chen (2016) who introduce a modeling framework for dynamic weighted networks; but also McLaughlin and EmBree (2018) , where the authors propose a framework to reconstruct a collaboration network. Further related works include Chakrabarti (2017) , where incentives of twitter users are analyzed; Ji and Jin (2016) where meta-analysis of citations in statistics papers are conducted; and Xin, Zhu, and Chipman (2017) , where compatibility of basketball players are analyzed via a network model. We connect our paper to these works by developing a latent variable sta-tistical model for dynamic weighted networks, where a persistence (drift) is modeled intuitively. Our model is specifically designed for instances where a network needs to be characterized by a single evolving variable, or when one is interested in obtaining a model-based quantitative measurement of the inter-temporal development of the homogeneity of a network.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on stability of Austrian interbank market. Other works in this area include Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006) and Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2004) who have looked at possible contagious effects and descriptive statistics of the Austrian financial network We extend their work by creating a statistical model of network evolution applied on the same dataset.
A Motivating Example
It is important to understand that a change in a financial network structure can have far-reaching and non-trivial consequences. To illustrate this fact further, consider a hypothetical financial network of four institutions (banks) represented by nodes with their mutual financial exposures (debt) represented by edges. In this simple example, connections are symmetric and every bank splits its investment into its neighbors equally. Furthermore, banks are required by a regulator to always keep a capital buffer to account for unexpected withdrawals, unfavorable economic conditions and other factors. Therefore, we assume that an institution remains safe unless it loses at least half of its investment. If that happens, the institution gets bankrupt and it might further negatively affect other banks in the network. To see how network structure affects the overall stability, consider a case where one of these four banks gets affected by an exogenous shock such that it has to declare bankruptcy. In such case, its neighbors will not get their respective investment and might suffer the same fate, putting their own neighbors in danger. This contagious behavior is dependent on how the banks are linked together, which illustrates the importance of structure when addressing questions on systemic importance and financial stability.
For the hypothetical case of four banks, there are 11 different network structures that can possibly occur: a subset of these are shown in Figure   1 .1. In the case shown in Figure 1 .1a, there is no danger of contagion since there are no edges to propagate shocks. An analogical result follows from the network shown in Figure 1 .1c, where a failure of one node is not sufficient to take down the rest because every institution is well diversified (remember that we have assumed a bank needs to lose at least half of its investment to fail while in this case neighbors of the bankrupt institution only lose one third). Problems arise in intermediately connected systems such as 1.1b, where an initial shock wipes out the whole system. This basic example hints at a much more complex issue of network stability that has been extensively studied by financial regulators in the past two decades. More importantly, it highlights that the level of diversification in a system may play a crucial role in determining its stability and that assessment of this trait for observed networks can prove challenging. In this paper, we address this impasse, introducing a statistical model which is specifically designed to measure the diversification of a financial system, hence obtaining a measure for one of the facets of systemic risk.
Networks of Interbank Exposures
A dynamic network of interbank exposures is a sequence of graphs where, for each time frame, the nodes correspond to banks and the edges correspond to the connections between them. In particular, the edges are directed and carry positive values indicating the claim of one bank to another. We note that an observed network of interbank exposures between N banks over T time frames may be represented as a collection of adjacency matrices of the same size N × N , as in the following definition:
Definition 2.1. A sequence of absolute exposures X = {X (t) } t∈T defined on the set of nodes V over the timespan T consists of adjacency matrices X (t) ∀t ∈ T with elements x (t) ij for t ∈ T , i ∈ V, j ∈ V, where x (t) ij corresponds to a financial exposure of bank i towards bank j in period t.
In this paper, we study the Austrian interbank market, where an adjacency matrix X (t) contains all of the mutual claims between any two of N = 800 Austrian banks at the corresponding time frame.
Unfortunately, we have a limited access to the data on absolute quantities due to privacy policy of the Austrian National Bank. In order to circumvent this issue, we use the following definition of a financial network of relative quantities instead:
Definition 2.2. A sequence of relative exposures Y = {Y (t) } t∈T on the set of nodes V over the timespan T has elements defined as follows:
This data is observed quarterly, from the spring of 2008 to the autumn of 2012, hence, T = 16 adjacency matrices are available in total (see Appendix A for further details on data structure). The sequence of relative exposures is important in both the exploratory analysis we have conducted as well as in our main model.
To model the dynamic evolution of a network, we assume discrete time steps in order to accommodate for our quarterly-observed data. A continuous time model in the spirit of Koskinen and Edling (2012) would constitute a possible extension of our model.
Throughout the paper, we deal with different probability distributions.
The normal distribution with mean u and variance v shall be denoted by u, v) , the Gamma distribution with shape parameter k and scale parameter l shall be referred to as Gamma(k,l) and a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by a vector α shall be referred to as Dir(α).
Data and Exploratory Analysis
In order to study the viability and implications of our model in practice,
we use a unique dataset obtained from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB).
As already mentioned before, it contains credit relationships between 800
Austrian financial institutions in the time period spanning from the spring of 2008 until the autumn of 2011. We create a subsample of "core banks" to see how the implications of our model are affected by the banks' size. In order to do so, we look at each bank's relevance:
Definition 3.1. A relevance of bank i in time period t is defined as:
In other words, we define relevance simply as the bank's overall sum of its interbank assets and liabilities. In order to have a better picture about the data, we have conducted a brief exploratory analysis of our dataset. In particular, it is interesting 1 Validity of the OeNB 100 subset can be justified further by examining the overall exposure of top 100 institutions. It turns out that the 100 most systemically relevant banks account for more than 95% of all edge weights in any given time frame. In other words, the 100 most systemically relevant banks are the ones responsible for the vast majority of all exposures within the system, which makes their closer examination interesting to see the evolution of connections in the sample. Table 1 Austrian banks have reduced their mutual exposures significantly, they were rarely completely cut off. Another important period is during the second and third quarter of 2011, which is roughly when the European sovereign debt crisis started. At the first glance, there does not seem to be much in relation to this event in our data. However, as we shall see later, our main model will provide further insight regarding the trend in diversification during this period.
In interbank markets, it is common to observe disassortative properties in the system, which roughly translates to nodes with a low number of neighbors being connected to nodes with high number of neighbors and vice versa (see Hurd (2016) ) . This property in financial networks is quite common We have observed several interesting patterns in the data which suggest that using a more involved model could indeed produce some new insights to the evolution of bank diversification. Since the main interest of our research lies in the diversification of agents in an interbank market, we have also looked at the evolution of bank entropy in time. For this purpose, we use a standard definition of entropy as follows:
of node i ∈ V at time t ∈ T is defined as:
Speaking more plainly, this quantity describes how an institution distributes its assets among counterparties. A bank with only one debtor would have entropy equal to zero, since its relative exposure is one for that debtor and zero for all the other banks. With an increased number of debtors with equal exposures, a node's entropy is increased and, for a fixed number of debtors, the entropy of a node is maximized when its assets are distributed evenly among neighbors. Ergo, if two nodes have the same number of outgoing connections, one may view the one with a higher entropy as better diversified.
In Figure 3 .4, we plot the change in nodes' entropies in consecutive periods
One can observe an increase in both mean and variance during the 13th to 14th period, which corresponds to the sovereign crisis in Europe. At that point, future bailouts of several EU countries were uncertain which might have added to the volatility in the market. Interestingly, no 
The Model
We use the relative interbank exposures y (t) ij from Definition 2.2, assuming that there are no self-connections such that when not stated otherwise, we always work with t ∈ T , i, j ∈ V and i = j. As these are relative exposures, it follows from definition that they satisfy:
We propose to model the vector y
as a Dirichlet random vector characterized by the parameters α
iN , where
Following the established standard in latent variable models, the data are assumed to be conditionally independent given the latent parameters
. Hence, the model likelihood reads as follows:
where, again, j varies in V and is different from i, and Γ (·) denotes the gamma function.
As concerns the α parameters, we separate a trend component from the sender and receiver random effects through the following deterministic representation:
With this formulation, the model parameters µ = µ (t) t∈T , θ = {θ i } i∈V and γ = {γ j } j∈V possess a straightforward interpretation.
Interpretation of model parameters
Before we move to parameter interpretation, we would like to note that the effect of α on a symmetric random vector Y ∼ Dir (α, . . . , α). Namely, it is important to see that the variance of Y decreases with an increase in α.
Since the values generated from a Dirichlet distribution lie in an Ndimensional simplex, low variance translates to
e.g. the values are more or less equally distributed. High variance, however, implies that one of the components turns out to be close to one while all the others are close to zero. This mechanic closely mimics the high-entropy homogeneous regime and the low-entropy heterogeneous regime introduced in Section 3, respectively.
In fact, in our formulation, the contribution given by µ (t) + θ i affects all of the components of α
i· in a symmetric fashion. Hence, we are essentially capturing the level of homogeneity in the network through a homogeneity trend parameter µ (t) and a node specific homogeneity random effect θ i . In other words, an increase in µ (t) + θ i corresponds to higher diversification of exposures for bank i at time t, resulting in a more homogeneous network structure. Vice versa, a decrease in µ (t) + θ i is linked with a decrease in diversification which in turn results in a more heterogeneous network structure.
The interpretation of γ j is similar. To see this, consider a non-symmetric random vector Y ∼ Dir (α 1 , . . . , α N ). In this case, an increase in a single parameter component α j determines a higher expected value in y j , at the expense of the other elements in Y. In our context, an increase in γ j tends to increase the weight of all edges that j receives from its counterparties.
Equivalently, one can say that in such case the bank j becomes more attractive, in the spirit of other banks concentrating their exposures more towards j.
To summarize:
• the parameter µ (t) indicates the global homogeneity level at time frame t ∈ T ;
• the parameter θ i characterizes the individual bank i homogeneity level as a random effect;
• the parameter γ j represents the bank j's attractiveness.
Bayesian hierarchical structure
We complete our model by introducing the following Bayesian hierarchical structure on the parameters we have mentioned earlier.
We assume a random walk process prior on the drift parameters µ as follows:
where η (t) ∼ N (0, 1/τ η ) and τ η ∼ Gamma(a η , b η ). The hyperparameter τ µ is user-defined and set to a small value to support a wide range of initial conditions. The hyperparameters a η and b η are also user-defined and set to small values (0.01) for non-informative settings.
The parameters θ and γ are assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian variables with:
As well as with the other hyperparameters, a θ , b θ , a γ and b γ are also set to small values (0.01) to keep a non-informative setting.
The arrangement of parameters in Figure 4 .1 summarizes the dependencies in our model graphically. Our proposed model has T drift parameters (µ), N diversification parameters (θ), N attractiveness parameters (γ), and 3 precision parameters (τ ). We use this section to describe their estimation procedure.
Identifiability
The additive structure in (6) yields a non-identifiable likelihood model.
For example, one may defineθ i = θ i + c andγ j = γ j + c for some c ∈ R and the likelihood value would be the same for the two configurations, i.e.
. One way to deal with such identifiability problem would be to include a penalization through the priors on θ and γ. One could specify more informative Gaussian priors centered in zero, which would in turn shrink the parameters to be distributed around zero.
However, such approach may also interfere with the results, since the model would not be able to capture the presence of outliers. Hence, we opt for a more commonly accepted method, and impose the γs to sum to zero. This is expressed through the following constraint:
This new model, characterized by T + 2N + 2 parameters, is now identifiable.
Markov chain Monte Carlo
The posterior distribution associated to our model factorizes as follows:
We adopt a fully Bayesian approach, relying on a Markov chain Monte
Carlo to obtain a random sample from the posterior distribution (8). Note that, in the following equations, the products are defined over the spaces T and V, with the only restriction that j and are always different from i.
Also, 1 A is equal to 1 if the event A is true or zero otherwise. We use a
Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler that alternates the following steps:
1. Sample µ (s) for all s ∈ T from the following full-conditional using Metropolis-Hastings with a Gaussian proposal:
2. Sample θ k for all k ∈ V from the following full-conditional using MetropolisHastings with a Gaussian proposal:
3. Sample γ for all ∈ V \ {1} from the following full-conditional using
Metropolis-Hastings with a Gaussian proposal:
4. Sample τ η from the following conjugate full-conditional:
5. Sample τ θ from the following conjugate full-conditional:
6. Sample τ γ from the following conjugate full-conditional:
The random draws obtained for the model parameters are then used to characterize their posterior distribution given the data.
Additional details
We ran our Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler on both datasets OeNB 800
and OeNB 100 for a total of 400,000 iterations. For both datasets, the first 200,000 iterations were discarded as burn-in. For the remaining sample, every 20-th draw was saved to produce the final results. In summary, we obtained 10,000 posterior draws for each model parameter.
For the parameters µ, θ and γ Metropolis-Hastings updates were used:
the Gaussian proposal variances were tuned individually for each parameter to make sure that all of the acceptance rates were between 22% and 30%. The trace plots and convergence diagnostic tests all showed very good convergence of the Markov chain.
Similarly to many other latent variable models for networks, the computational cost required by our sampler grows as T N 2 . We implemented the algorithm in C++ and used parallel computing via the library OpenMPI to speed up the procedure. We note that, for the full dataset, an iteration required an average of approximately 0.75 seconds on a Debian machine with
Analysis of the results
First, we study the diversification of the banks which translates to changes in network homogeneity. The drift parameter µ (t) , shown in Figure 6 .1, exhibits an upward trend for both datasets. This trend is in both cases more tion further confirms our ideas about a stylized financial network where the disassortative behavior is very common.
A similarly heavy tailed distribution can be observed regarding the attractiveness parameter γ (see Figure 6 .4 for the distribution of the point estimates). In addition, Figure 6 .5 shows that, generally, θ and γ are closely γ parameters. We note that there seems to be no explicit pattern and no apparent relation with the relevance of the corresponding banks. We point out, however, that the two plots are on two different scales on both axes, which is expected since much more data is available for inference in the OeNB 800 dataset, hence yielding more reliable estimates.
Finally, we also show the posterior densities for the variance parameters 1/τ η , 1/τ θ and 1/τ γ in Figure 6 .7. For both datasets, these plots confirm that the drift parameter is rather stable over time, and that the diversification and attractiveness are not particularly diverse across banks, overall. 
Conclusion
This paper's main contribution is to propose a brand new framework to model the evolution of dynamic weighted networks, and to capture systematic parts of their development. Our application to the Austrian interbank market serves as an example of how such model can be used in practice as a means to measure exposure diversification and, hence, one aspect of systemic risk. In our analysis we have shown that the Austrian market exhibited a sustained increase in banks' diversification, possibly as a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis. In particular, differently from a descriptive analysis, our model captured a distinct upward dynamic in network homogeneity as Our results also showed that the roles played by the different banks can be vastly different, particularly in the context of exposure diversification. Our findings emphasize that larger banks, which are generally more susceptible to systemic risk, tend to use more conservative strategies and to spread out evenly their credit risks.
One limitation of our modeling framework is that it only focuses on the relative exposures, hence discarding the real magnitudes of the claims. Future extensions of this work may consider a joint modeling of the exposure values and how they are diversified among neighbors.
Another possible extension of our framework would include a more sophisticated prior structure on the model parameters. For example, one may define a clustering problem on the banks, where different clusters are characterized by different network homogeneity drifts µ.
Finally, we would like to remark that the Dirichlet likelihood specification is not the only possible one. Besides, the Dirichlet distribution is known to exhibit very little flexibility, since, when the variance is large, it tends to assign most of the probability density to the highest entropy configurations. This does not necessarily reflect the features exhibited by the data.
However, we argue that in our application the Dirichlet assumption is very reasonable, and, more importantly, it provides a convenient framework with a straightforward interpretation of the model parameters.
Formally, making use of Definition 2.1, the observable data in our sample can be viewed as a dynamic adjacency matrix D:
Definition A.1. A sequence of observable exposures D = {D (t) } t∈T on the set of nodes V over the timespan T is defined as follows:
∀i, j, k, l ∈ V, ∀t ∈ T
It is not possible to make inter-temporal analysis of changes in exposures while working directly with sequence D, because every exposure is scaled against the highest exposure in its time period. In order to circumvent this issue and obtain information which is comparable in time, we have devised the following procedure.
We make an assumption about the stability of the Austrian market.
Namely, when looking at the change of a particular edge value between two consecutive periods from d (t) ij to d (t+1) ij , the ratio
with highest likelihood of occurrence in the sample corresponds to banks keeping the absolute value of their exposures unchanged. Indeed, after examining this ratio in all consecutive periods, we observe that the most frequent value is situated in the middle of the sample and is always a clear outlier in terms of likelihood of occurrence.
2 2 In most cases, this value is around 1 which suggests that the largest exposure in the network is mostly stable. An exception arises between dates 2 and 3 which correspond to the second and third quarter of 2008. As this is the exact time of the height of US subprime mortgage crisis, we believe that the "big players" in our dataset have been influenced by these events, resulting in the change of their exposures and subsequent substantial rescaling of the whole system. According to our methodology, the largest exposure in the network It's straightforward to rescale the whole dataset using this procedure. Despite the fact that we still cannot observe the actual levels of exposures between banks in our sample, we are now able to compare them inter-temporally which is an extremely useful property.
has dropped to almost one third of its value in the span of two quarters, but it returns gradually back to its former level eventually.
